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In 1968, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the "second col-
lision" or "crashworthiness" doctrine.' The concept allows recovery
against a manufacturer of a vehicle for an injury over and above that caused
by the initial collision and that attributable to a design defect.2 Since its
inception, the second collision doctrine has been accepted by the majority of
jurisdictions,3 but with a lack of uniformity as to its application. In particu-
lar, two lines of authority have developed relating to the burden of appor-
tionment of injuries.4
1. Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
2. Second collision cases involve an actual secondary impact with a specific part of the vehi-
cle, while crashworthy cases are based on a more generalized complaint that the vehicle was
unsafe for a foreseeable collision. See Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second
Collision" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600, 606-07 (1977).
3. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th
Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974);
Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (Ist Cir. 1974); Fortunato v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d
962 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972); Passwaters v. General Motors, 454 F.2d 1270
(8th Cir. 1972); Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Bremier v. Volk-
swagon of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp.,
308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors, 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Badorek v. General Motors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Friend v. General
Motors, 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272
Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Brandunberger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont.
506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d
644 (1973); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Engberg v. Ford Motor
Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Turner v. General Motors, 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1974); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
4. See, eg., Ghiardi, Second Collision Law - Wisconsin, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1985); Com-
ment, Limitations on Manufacturer's Liability in Second Collision Actions, 43 MONT. L. REV. 109
(1982) [hereinafter Comment, Manufacturer's Liability]; Comment, Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk:
Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Apportioning Injuries in a Second Collision Case, 48 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 177 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Plaintiff's Burden]; Note, Apportionment of Damages in
the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475 (1977). One commentator has suggested that the
focus of apportionment in a second collision case is a determination of injury enhancement, rather
than an apportionment of the particular injuries occurring in the accident. Note, Second Collision
Liability: A Critique of Two Approaches to Plaintiff's Burden of Proof, 68 IOWA L. REV. 811
(1983); see also Comment, Plaintiff' Burden, supra, at 189.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Because of the difficulty involved in proving the enhanced injury, trial
courts have been forced to grapple with a number of complex evidentiary
issues.' One of the most difficult questions relates to the admissibility of
evidence concerning the cause of the original collision as compared to the
cause of the plaintiff's enhanced injury. Since, in its theoretical form, the
second collision theory only relates to the cause of the enhanced injury,
causal responsibility for the underlying accident is irrelevant in the claim
against the manufacturer.6 Therefore, evidence relating strictly to the cause
of the original impact is generally irrelevant in proving that the manufac-
turer's product was defective.
Under Wisconsin's second collision law, however, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing injury and damages caused by the defective product,
while the manufacturer has the burden of allocating damages between two
or more impacts.7 If the plaintiff proves that the manufacturer's defective
product was a cause of his injuries, he need not prove what portion of indi-
visible harm is attributable solely to the manufacturer. The manufacturer,
therefore, is compelled to prove a negative - those damages not caused by
the defective product.' The query is whether the manufacturer should be
permitted to introduce evidence of "accident-causing" negligence in order
to satisfy its burden of proving which injuries were enhanced. Wisconsin
has not had the opportunity to address this precise issue.9
This Article will review the theoretical underpinnings of the enhanced
injury concept and discuss the different theories of apportionment. It will
also assess the Wisconsin theory of apportionment and the complex eviden-
tiary problems the theory creates for the manufacturer attempting to satisfy
its burden of proof.
5. See generally Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of Injuries Resulting
From "Second Collision," 9 A.L.R.4th 494 (1981); Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Cases
Determining Whether Product is Defectively Designed, 96 A.L.R.3d 22 (1979).
6. See Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 229, 278
(1985).
7. Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 125 Wis. 2d 145, 153-54, 370 N.W.2d 815, 819-20 (Ct.
App. 1985). The language in Maskrey, which places the burden to apportion damages on the
manufacturer of the defective product, has been criticized as being based upon the dicta in John-
son v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433B (1965). See Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 21.
8. See Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 21.
9. See Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1978) (court addressed issues of
admissibility of accident-causing negligence under Wisconsin law).
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II. THE CONCEPT OF THE ENHANCED INJURY
Courts and writers have disagreed regarding the distinctiveness of the
enhanced injury theory. 10 One court has treated the theory as being sui
generis." Other courts have employed traditional tort principles in apply-
ing the doctrine.12 It has also been suggested by one author that the theory
is neither sui generis nor subject to routine application of traditional tort
principles, rather it is simply a particularized treatment of the proximate
cause issue. 3 Another writer has commented that the doctrine is merely a
method of apportioning injuries among multiple defendants. 4
Much of the confusion in attempting to apply the second collision doc-
trine stems from the decision in Larsen v. General Motors.'5 The plaintiff in
Larsen claimed a head injury as a result of a negligently designed steering
column, which, on impact, caused the steering wheel to thrust backwards
into the plaintiff. The plaintiff conceded that the design defect did not cause
the accident, but alleged that he received injuries which he would not have
otherwise received, but for the defective design. The court stated the gen-
eral rule regarding manufacturer liability as follows: "Where the manufac-
turer's negligence in design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon
the user of its products, the manufacturer should be liable for the injury
caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care in the design."16
The issue in Larsen involved a determination of whether a collision was
within the "intended use" of the automobile. The court held that the manu-
facturer had a duty to exercise reasonable care in its design of a vehicle so
as to avoid unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. 7 The
court then defined the parameters of recovery in a second collision case:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufac-
turer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused
by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that
probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision
absent the defective design. 18
10. See generally Harris, supra note 6, at 229.
11. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 742 (3d Cir. 1976).
12. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, 669 F.2d 1199, 1207 (8th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Ford Motor
Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
13. See Harris, supra note 6, at 246.
14. See Foland, supra note 2, at 608.
15. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
16. Id. at 502.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 503.
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Although the manufacturer argued that it would be very difficult to ap-
portion the plaintiff's injury, the court ignored that argument and stated
that the "obstacles of apportionment are not insurmountable." 9 The fail-
ure of the Larsen court to fully address the complications inherent in appor-
tioning enhanced injuries has resulted in a divergence of authority on the
plaintiff's standard of proof and allocation of damages.
III. APPORTIONMENT OF ENHANCED INJURIES
Occasionally, the injuries caused by an alleged design defect are clearly
identifiable from those caused by the initial collision.20 Certain injuries,
however, such as death, have been declared indivisible as a matter of law.21
In the typical tort case involving multiple causes, each tortfeasor is charged
with liability for the entire amount of damages even though the injuries may
be indivisible to the trier of fact.22 In a second collision case, however, a
manufacturer cannot, as a matter of law, be held liable for the injuries
caused by the first collision or impact, since the manufacturer did not cause
the collision.23 Because the second collision doctrine differs from the ortho-
dox product liability action, two opposing views on the standard of proof
have developed.24 These views are set forth in Huddell v. Levin 25 and
Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G.26
In Huddell, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted New Jersey
law as requiring the plaintiff in second collision cases to prove the proper
apportionment of damages. At the trial court, Mrs. Huddell presented evi-
dence that the impact of her husband's head against the head restraint se-
verely fractured his skull, causing fatal brain damage.27 The jury returned a
19. Id. The Eighth Circuit was reviewing only the district court's summary judgment motion
against the plaintiff.
20. See, e.g., Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 263 (8th Cir. 1976); Turcotte v. Ford
Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 176 (lst Cir. 1974).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) (general discussion of problems
of apportionment); see also Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978); Foland,
supra note 2, at 609.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment (2)(i) (1965).
23. Id.
24. The standard of proof in a second collision case has been equated with the party that
bears the burden of proving the apportionment of damages. See generally Note, Apportionment of
Damages, supra note 4, at 475.
25. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
26. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
27. In Huddell, the plaintiff was driving his 1970 Chevrolet Nova across a bridge when the
car ran out of gas. Huddell's vehicle was struck from behind. The impact slammed Huddell's
head against his head restraint, causing excessive brain damage and death. Proof was offered that
although Huddell would have sustained injuries even with another type of head restraint, the
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verdict against General Motors under a strict liability theory, but found no
liability on Levin, the other driver, or Levin's employer under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. The trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict against Levin and his employer. General Motors appealed,
charging principally that the trial court should have required the jury to
apportion the damages rather than impose joint and several liability on the
defendants.28
The Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had shown that the head re-
straint system was defectively designed and had caused the plaintiff's inju-
ries. The court further held that the plaintiff must offer proof of the
following:
First, in establishing that the design in question was defective, the
plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative, safer design, practicable
under the circumstances.... Second, the plaintiff must offer proof
of what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the alternative,
safer design been used.... Third, as a corollary to the second aspect
of proof, the plaintiff must offer some method of establishing the
extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design.29
The Third Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second
and third elements with respect to the role of the head restraint in contrib-
uting to Huddell's death. The court stated that the plaintiff had failed to
introduce sufficient evidence to allow the jury to apportion damages be-
tween the driver and the manufacturer.3"
The Third Circuit further disputed the district court's finding that the
burden of apportionment should rest with the manufacturer: "[T]he auto-
mobile manufacturer is liable only for the enhanced injuries attributable to
the defective product. This being the essence of the liability, we cannot
agree that the burden of proof on that issue can properly be placed on the
defendant manufacturer.
31
defective design of the restraint system in the Nova increased the severity of the injury. Huddell,
537 F.2d at 731-32.
28. Id. at 731.
29. Id. at 737-38.
30. Id.
31. Id. The district court avoided deciding which party had the burden of apportionment by
stating that death is a single, indivisible injury incapable of apportionment. Huddell v. Levin, 395
F. Supp. 64, 79 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 726 (1976). The decision was based primarily
upon the following language contained in § 433B of the RESTATEMENT:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the
plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the
harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportion-
ment is upon each such actor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965).
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Contrary to Huddell, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mitchell v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G.,32 concluded that it would be unreasonable for the
plaintiff to carry the burden of proving enhancement. The plaintiff in
Mitchell was a passenger in a vehicle who suffered a spinal cord injury that
rendered him a paraplegic. The right front passenger door was found open
after the accident.33 The jury found that the door of the plaintiff's vehicle
was defective and made an allocation of enhancement of injuries. 34 Judg-
ment was entered accordingly.35
The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that Mitchell did not involve seg-
regation between inevitable injuries and enhanced injuries, 36 and therefore,
the damages could not be apportioned. Thus, the manufacturer was held
liable for the total amount as a joint tortfeasor.37
Instead of remanding the case to the trial court, the court used the op-
portunity to attack the majority rule of requiring the plaintiff to prove en-
hancement of injuries:
A rule of law which requires a plaintiff to prove what portion of
indivisible harm was caused by each party and what might have hap-
pened in lieu of what did happen requires obvious speculation and
proof of the impossible. This approach converts the common law
rules governing principles of legal causation into a morass of confu-
sion and uncertainty.38
The court then went on to reject the manufacturer's argument that a
plaintiff must prove distinct injuries between separate impacts in order to
satisfy a prima facie case:
The argument is made that since the manufacturer's liability is only
for the enhanced injury, without plaintiffs proving that the injury
would not have occurred in the first collision, there is no proof of an
enhanced injury. The difficulty with this reasoning is that where
there is but a single indivisible injury (e.g., death, paraplegia) it re-
quires plaintiffs to rely on pure speculation, since in many instances
it is impossible to show which tortfeasor caused the indivisible harm.
Such a rule ignores common law principles on legal causation. Our
32. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).




37. Id. at 1206. The special verdict answers indicated that the jury did not understand the
issues it was asked to resolve. Id. at 1202-03.
38. Id. at 1205.
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statement in Larsen should not be construed so as to subject a jury
to a complete conjectural result. 39
The Mitchell court's effort to alleviate plaintiff's burden of proving en-
hanced injuries in indivisible injury cases completely undermines the con-
cept of the enhanced injury. In the absence of affirmative proof of enhanced
injuries, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the occurrence of a second
impact. The existence of two separate and distinct impacts causing indivisi-
ble injuries is the core principle behind the second collision doctrine.'
IV. ACCIDENT AND INJURY CAUSING NEGLIGENCE
The Larsen court failed to critically examine the plaintiff's burden of
proof and set forth specific guidelines as to the sufficiency of evidence neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case. This has created difficult evidentiary
issues in the jurisdictions following the landmark decision. Wisconsin ex-
plicitly adopted the Larsen decision in Arbet v. Gussarson,4' but did not
have the opportunity to address the plaintiff's burden of proof and alloca-
tion of damages. These issues were subsequently discussed, however, in
Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 42 and Maskrey v. Volkswagen-
werk, A. G.g3 Sumnicht and Maskrey require the plaintiff to satisfy its prima
facie case by introducing evidence that a defective product was a substantial
factor in causing harm for which the plaintiff claims damages. Once the
plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden of apportioning
damages shifts to the manufacturer of the product.
Relieving the plaintiff from affirmatively proving the allocation of dam-
ages in a second collision case provides the plaintiff's counsel with an op-
portunity to selectively exclude harmful evidence relating to the cause of
the collision. This strategy is typically employed in cases of serious injury
or death where the plaintiff has substantial contributory negligence. It is
also used in automobile collisions where the defendant-driver is uninsured
or insolvent, but the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product has a
deep pocket. The plaintiff may attempt to exclude "accident-causing evi-
dence" through a protective order or declaratory ruling on the grounds that
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
41. 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975). In Arbet, the sole issue on appeal was "whether
an automobile manufacturer may incur liability for injuries to occupants of a car arising from the
manufacturer's negligence in designing the car such that it was unreasonably unsafe in an acci-
dent." Id. at 553, 225 N.W.2d at 433. The court relied specifically on Larsen in overruling the
demurrer of the manufacturer. Id. at 559, 225 N.W.2d at 436-37.
42. 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984).
43. 125 Wis. 2d 145, 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985).
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the evidence has nothing to do with the manufacturer's responsibility for
the plaintiff's enhanced injuries. In other words, plaintiff would argue that
comparing evidence of "accident-causing" negligence with "injury-causing"
negligence is tantamount to comparing apples and oranges.
There is a clear demarcation between accident-causing fault and injury-
enhancing fault. Accident-causing fault relates to liability apportioned on
the basis of contribution to the proximate cause of the collision. Injury-
enhancing fault refers to liability apportioned on the basis of contribution to
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's enhanced injuries. The manufacturer
is only liable for enhanced injuries; therefore, it is argued that evidence re-
lating to the cause of the collision is irrelevant and will only confuse and
mislead the jury.
The irrelevancy of accident-causing fault in a second collision case has
been suggested by several authors. One author has stated the following:
[T]he accident-causing fault of a plaintiff is irrelevant in second colli-
sion cases. A comparison of accident-causing fault and injury-en-
hancing fault contradicts Larsen and the axiom by basing
manufacturer liability on the proximate causation of the first colli-
sion and not on the proximate cause of the enhanced injuries. Be-
cause second collision claims are often brought when a plaintiff's
conduct is the proximate cause of the first collision, the comparison
of accident-causing fault and injury-enhancing fault emasculates sec-
ond collision liability.'
Another author has suggested that evidence of the accident-causing neg-
ligence of the plaintiff is irrelevant since it cannot reduce the plaintiff's
recovery:
In enhanced injury cases, unlike ordinary products liability cases, a
claimant's fault in causing the accident is not a basis for reducing his
recovery.... The cause of the contact has no bearing on the issue of
whether an object's response to the contact was a reasonable one.
The trier of fact's analysis must be limited to the nature and severity
of the contact and object's response. A negligent operator is entitled
to the same protection against unnecessary injury as the careful user
of the same product is entitled.45
44. Comment, Manufacturer's Liability, supra note 4, at 125. The author of a Michigan Law
Review article argues the same proposition. The "plaintiff's negligence should not be a defense
for a manufacturer in an action for enhancement of injuries. The manufacturer's affirmative de-
fense based on the plaintiff's contributory negligence is no more persuasive than his similar claim
that the collision of the vehicle and the pedestrian constituted an intervening cause." Note, The
Automobile Manufacturer's Liability to Exterior Design: New Dimensions in Crashworthiness, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1654, 1666 (1973).
45. See Harris, supra note 6, at 265-66.
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There are few cases which discuss the admissibility of accident-causing
negligence in a second collision case. Furthermore, the decisions that have
addressed the issue have not explained it thoroughly. Perhaps the most
complete examination of the topic appears in Trust Corp. of Montana v.
Piper Aircraft.46
The strict liability action in Trust Corp. was a result of an airplane
crash. Plaintiff alleged enhanced injuries caused by a lack of a shoulder
restraint system. Plaintiff also admitted that the cause of the crash was not
the design defect.47 There was evidence that upon takeoff the plane was
overweight and the air temperature too high. The plaintiff moved to strike
the defendant's affirmative defenses relating to assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence, arguing that both were irrelevant in a crashworthiness
action.
The court determined that the plaintiff's conduct could be compared to
the manufacturer's liability for a defective product.48 The court then stated
that all of plaintiff's contributory negligence should be considered:
Plaintiff's position boils down to this: that the accident-causing fac-
tors and the injury-causing factors are qualitatively different and
must be considered separately. Plaintiff argues that this court
should exclude evidence dealing with the nature and cause of the
crash and allow only that evidence pertaining to the enhancement of
injuries as a result of Piper's failure to provide shoulder harnesses.
Although plaintiff's position has some merit in a second collision
type case, the modern trend rejects this piecemeal approach.
Rather, inquiry focuses on the product design as an integrated
whole, and a consideration of all the factors that contributed to the
event which caused the injury .... Thus an examination of all the
circumstances (e.g., speed, angle, weight, etc.), prior to and after im-
pact is proper in fairness to the parties. In short, all of plaintiff's
conduct, regardless of labels attached to that conduct, is to be com-
pared to defendant's liability.49
A similar result was reached in Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co.50 The action
arose out of a two car accident in which plaintiff's Mercury Comet was
rear-ended by defendant Hilker's Plymouth. Plaintiff claimed that Ford's
fuel tank design was unreasonably dangerous. Evidence was introduced at
trial that Hilker had been drinking throughout the day and that his speed
46. 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
47. Id. at 1094.
48. Id. at 1098.
49. Id. (citation omitted).
50. 590 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1978).
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before impact ranged between forty-five to sixty miles per hour. In a special
verdict, the jury found Hilker negligent, but that his negligence was not a
cause of plaintiff's injuries.51
The principal issue on appeal was whether there was credible evidence
on which the jury could find that Hilker's negligence was not a cause of
plaintiff's injuries.52 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the
manufacturer's argument that Hilker's negligence must have contributed to
plaintiff's injuries:
We agree with the defendant's contention as a matter of common
sense and are of the opinion that the Wisconsin Court would deal
similarly with the facts before us. To find Hilker's conduct which
resulted in such severe impact not causal of plaintiff's injuries is be-
yond the bounds of reason.53
In addition to Trust Corp. and Fietzer, another court expressly accepted
contributory negligence as a defense in a strict liability case involving a
second collision.5' A different court indicated in dicta that evidence of
plaintiff's intoxication was relevant in establishing an affirmative defense of
product misuse and failure to use available safety devices.
These cases do not represent a general rule regarding the admissibility
of accident-causing negligence in a second collision case. Furthermore, de-
spite the language in Trust Corp., there does not appear to be a trend in
jurisdictions allowing the admission of such evidence in second collision
cases. The admissibility of accident-causing negligence will be determined
by whether the particular jurisdiction recognizes that negligence, in causing
an accident to occur, is not a basis for reducing an enhanced injury award.56
51. Id. at 217.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 218. The court noted that the cause question is for the jury in all cases where
different answers are within the bounds of reason. Id.
54. Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 336, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977).
55. Daly v. General Motors, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 745-46, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
392 (1978). But see Badorek v. General Motors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 932, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 325
(1970) (evidence of inebriation of plaintiff-driver, or other drivers or passengers, should be ex-
cluded unless that evidence is relevant to some other issue).
56. Several courts have implicitly recognized that negligence in causing an accident to occur
is not a basis for reducing an enhanced injury award. See Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540
F.2d 762, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); Passwaters v. General Motors, 454 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (8th Cir.
1972); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303, 305 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v.
General Motors, 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-73 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82,
86-87, 583 P.2d 305, 307 (1978); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont.
506, 516, 513 P.2d 268, 274 (1973); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 230, 166 S.E.2d 173, 185
(1969), aff'd on rehearing, 255 S.C. 136, 177 S.E.2d 548 (1970); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert,
86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
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Courts will also consider whether the manufacturer carries the burden of
apportioning injuries.
V. WiscoNsIN THEORY OF APPORTIONMENT
Wisconsin has not had the opportunity to address the admissibility of
accident-causing negligence in a second collision case. Because of the lack
of precedential appellate authority, there is some confusion as to whether
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and conduct of the other defend-
ant-drivers should be admissible at trial, or even discoverable prior to trial.
In the absence of any authority on this precise issue, courts must look to the
standards of proof as enunciated in Sumnicht and Maskrey. Although these
cases do not address the admissibility of evidence, they set forth the ele-
ments of plaintiff's cause of action and the manufacturer's burden of proof.
A number of evidentiary problems relating to apportionment of dam-
ages stem from the decision in Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA.57
Sumnicht was a passenger in a Toyota that left the roadway and collided
with a tree. He was rendered a quadriplegic after the collision. Sumnicht
settled out of court with the driver under a Pierrenger Release. 8 He con-
tinued the trial against Toyota on the theory that the front seat system was
defective and negligently designed and manufactured. The jury awarded
4.7 million dollars in damages and apportioned the negligence at 50% to
the defective seat manufacturer and 50% to the driver.59 Toyota appealed.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished between the burden
of proof and causation and the burden of apportioning damages:
[O]nly after Sumnicht has proven what injuries were caused by
Toyota is the issue of apportionment of damages properly raised.
The precise issue here is not which party bears the burden of appor-
tioning damages in cases involving joint tortfeasors, but what quan-
tum of evidence must a plaintiff bring forth in a "second collision"
products liability case to prove that his injuries were proximately
caused by the manufacturer's defect.6"
The court then stated that in a second collision case, a plaintiff "must
prove that the defective product was a substantial factor in causing harm
from which damages are claimed." 61 The court further stated that if the
plaintiff proves that the defect was a cause of his injuries, he need not prove
57. 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984).
58. The release bars a non-settling tortfeasor from a right of contribution from the settling
parties. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
59. Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 347-48, 360 N.W.2d at 6.
60. Id. at 353-54, 360 N.W.2d at 9.
61. Id. at 358, 360 N.W.2d at 11.
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what portion of indivisible harm is attributable solely to the manufacturer;
the manufacturer and the defendant drivers become joint tortfeasors and
their liability is joint and several. In so holding, the court specifically re-
jected the tripartite test of Huddell.62
The Sumnicht court concluded that the plaintiff's injuries were indivisi-
ble. Accordingly, the language relating to the apportionment of damages
has been criticized as having no precedential value.63 Nonetheless,
Sumnicht's dicta and corresponding repudiation of the Huddell decision be-
came law in Maskrey v. Volkswagen werk, A. G. 4
The Maskrey decision involved a two car collision in which the plaintiff
sustained serious injuries. The jury found that Volkswagen had negligently
designed and tested the vehicle, and that such negligence was a substantial
factor in causing Maskrey's enhanced injuries.65 The jury also found Szuta,
the defendant driver, causally negligent. Maskrey was found negligent for
failing to wear a seatbelt.66
The Maskrey court found that Volkswagen was a successive tortfeasor
and placed the burden to allocate damages on the manufacturer:
[T]he plaintiff has the burden of proof to show injury and damages
caused by the negligence of the tortfeasors, but that it is the defend-
ants' burden to allocate the damages from two or more impacts, and
that separate verdict questions for the comparative negligence dam-
ages are mandated in this circumstance.67
Therefore, under Maskrey, once the plaintiff has established that the de-
fective product was a substantial factor in causing his injuries, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to apportion the damages between the two
impacts. Therefore, the manufacturer must offer evidence segregating the
injuries that were proximately caused in the first collision from the en-
hanced injuries that were proximately caused by the allegedly defective
product. Accordingly, not only is the manufacturer required to prove a
negative, i.e., which injuries were not enhanced by the product, but it is also
required to offer affirmative evidence that enhanced injuries occurred.
Under the second collision theory, what should have been the principal ele-
62. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63. See Ghiardi, supra note 4, at 13-15.
64. 125 Wis. 2d 145, 370 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985).
65. Id. at 151, 370 N.W.2d at 818.
66. The jury allocated the damages as follows: 57% of Maskrey's damages were "enhanced
injuries;" 28% of the injuries would have occurred absent a defect in the vehicle; and 15% of
Maskrey's injuries were caused by his failure to wear a seat belt. Id. at 152, 370 N.W.2d at 819.
67. Id. at 153-54, 370 N.W.2d at 818-20 (citing Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 301-07,
243 N.W.2d 815, 825-28 (1976)).
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ment of plaintiff's prima facie case has ironically become the manufac-
turer's burden of proof.
VI. EVIDENCE OF ACCIDENT CAUSING NEGLIGENCE
Because under Wisconsin law the manufacturer carries the burden of
separating the injuries caused between the successive impacts, one plain-
tiff's strategy is to attempt to exclude harmful evidence relating to the cause
of the original collision. The type of evidence that is principally related to
the cause of the original impact includes the pre-accident conduct or con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff and the negligence of the other defend-
ant-drivers at or before the point of original impact. The simplistic
approach to ruling on the admissibility of "accident-causing" negligence is
to reason that it can never be heard by the jury because it is unrelated to the
enhanced injuries of the plaintiff. A proper analysis of its admissibility re-
quires the trial judge to examine the type of evidence sought to be intro-
duced by the parties in relation to their respective burdens of proof. This
approach should take into account the special verdict used in Maskrey.68
A. Contributory Negligence
A plaintiff assumes responsibility for those injuries attributable to his
own conduct, specifically the non-enhanced injuries attributable to his in-
jury-enhancing fault.69 Certain actions by the plaintiff, including contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk70 and misuse of the product7 may
68. See infra note 75.
69. See generally Comment, Manufacturer's Liability, supra note 4, at 120-21.
70. The most commonly invoked formulation of this defense in strict liability tort cases is
that set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which is as follows:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller,
but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a
failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its exist-
ence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under
the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict
liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
71. The most commonly invoked statement of this defense is that set out in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), which is as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a
safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it
1989]
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contribute to the proximate cause of plaintiff's enhanced injuries, and
should therefore be admissible at trial in order for the manufacturer to sat-
isfy its burden of proof.
Wisconsin recognizes misuse, abuse or alteration of a product as a de-
fense in a strict liability action.72 In a second collision case, evidence of a
plaintiff's misuse or nonuse of a product includes failure to use safety belts,
shoulder harnesses, or other safety devices installed by the manufacturer to
reduce or prevent injuries during a collision.73 Injury enhancing negligence
could also include the use of the vehicle or product for a purpose never
intended by the manufacturer, or failure to maintain a product according to
manufacturer's instructions. For example, a plaintiff's failure to properly
maintain brakes on an automobile could constitute a substantial factor in
causing an enhanced injury.74 Similarly, loading the inside of a vehicle with
items that increase the risk of injury could also constitute "injury-enhanc-
ing" negligence.
The introduction of evidence relating to the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff may create difficult evidentiary issues. For example, should
evidence of intoxication, lack of sleep or failure to wear prescription glasses
be admissible when the only defendant is the manufacturer of the defective
product? Pre-accident conduct or contributory negligence of this sort ap-
pears to have no logical connection with the proximate cause of plaintiff's
enhanced injuries. However, it relates to the cause of the original collision
as well as the injuries that would have been sustained in the accident absent
a defective product. Under Wisconsin second collision law, the manufac-
turer must separate and distinguish these non-enhanced injuries from the
enhanced injuries.
is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time
that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evi-
dence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the
burden is not sustained. Safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller will, however,
include proper packaging, necessary sterilization, and other precautions required to permit
the product to remain safe for a normal length of time when handled in a normal manner.
72. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
73. One court has remanded a case for jury consideration of the effect of plaintiff's failure to
lock his door in comparing the liability of the plaintiff and the manufacturer in causing plaintiff's
enhanced injuries. Daly v. General Motors, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
74. Ordinarily a brake failure would be a proximate cause of the collision, not enhanced
injuries. However, expert testimony could be adduced to prove that a properly maintained brake
system would not have prevented a hypothetical head-on collision, but could have reduced the
momentum of one of the vehicles, and therefore reduced the overall severity of the impact and
resulting injuries.
75. See, e.g., Friend v. General Motors, 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968).
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Wisconsin has not had an opportunity to address these evidentiary is-
sues. In at least two reported decisions, however, it has discussed whether
contributory negligence should be considered by the jury in apportioning
damages in the enhanced injury portion of the special verdict.
In Maskrey, the jury instructions and special verdict allowed the jury to
first allocate a percentage of negligence to each of the actors which caused
all of Maskrey's injuries,76 including the negligence of the plaintiff. The
jury was then instructed in a separate portion of the verdict to allocate the
percentage of injuries that were enhanced by the presence of a defect as
compared with the injuries that would have occurred in the accident absent
a defect. 7 Maskrey's contributory negligence was not considered in this
portion of the verdict. The jury was asked to assess Maskrey's conduct only
with respect to his failure to wear a seat belt. Seat belt negligence is concep-
tually distinct from contributory negligence insofar as it directly relates to
causal responsibility for enhanced injuries.
In a more recent case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether the trial court erred when it failed to assess the plaintiff's
contributory negligence in the enhanced injury portion of the special ver-
76. Maskrey v. Volkswagenwerk, 125 Wis. 2d 145, 158, 370 N.W.2d 815, 822 (1985). Special
verdict question No. 11 read as follows:
Assuming that the total negligence which caused all of Michael Maskrey's injuries to be
100%, what percentage of such negligence do you attribute to:
A. Thomas Szuta? 43%
B. Michael Maskrey? 0
(If you did not answer Question No. 4 or if you answered
Question No. 4 "No," then insert "0")
C. The Volkswagon Defendants? (If you did not answer 57%
Question No. 6 or Question No. 8 or if you answered all
subdivisions of those questions "No" then insert "0")
Total 100%
77. Id. Question No. 12 of the special verdict read as follows:
Assuming the total injuries and damages sustained by Michael Maskrey to be 100%, what
percentage of those injuries do you attribute to:
A. Those enhanced injuries were caused by the presence of a %
defect, if any, in the Volkswagon van?
(Answer this subdivision only if you have answered Question
No. 6 or Question No. 8 "Yes.")
B. Those injuries, if any, which would have occurred as a result %
of the accident without there being any defect in the
Volkswagon van, and absent any failure to wear a seat belt/
shoulder restraint?
C. Those injuries which were caused by Michael Maskrey's %
failure to wear a seat belt/shoulder restraint?




dict.78 The Farrell case was submitted to a jury in two phases in the special
verdict. In the first phase, the jury apportioned responsibility among the
parties, including the plaintiff, for the damages caused to Farrell for his
entanglement in the husking rolls of a cornpicker. Farrell was determined
to be legally responsible for causing his initial entanglement in the product,
and the manufacturer was exonerated as to this phase of the plaintiff's
claim.
The next portion of the special verdict dealt with the enhancement
phase of the accident. The jury was asked if the John Deere Company was
responsible for failing to design an emergency shut-off switch on the husker.
The jury answered this question in the affirmative and determined such con-
duct to be causal of Farrell's enhanced injuries. Finally, the special verdict
asked the jury to bring the two parts of the verdict together by allocating
the percentage of damages and injuries due to the entanglement and that
due to the enhancement.
John Deere appealed on the grounds that the negligence of Farrell and
the other defendants were not considered in the enhancement phase of the
verdict. In upholding the verdict structure, the court stated: "Deere was
alleged to have enhanced the injuries through its failure to provide an emer-
gency shut-off device. There was no evidence that Farrell or the other de-
fendants in any way contributed to the design defect that enhanced Farrell's
injuries."79
Although the enhanced injury portion of the special verdicts in Maskrey
and Farrell did not assess the plaintiff's contributory negligence in causing
enhanced injuries, both cases implicitly recognize the relevance of evidence
of plaintiff's contributory negligence in causing the initial impact. The ac-
cident-causing phase of both special verdicts inquired into the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. This is a necessary inquiry even in a second-
collision case involving a single comparison between a plaintiff-driver and a
defendant-manufacturer.
If the special verdict does not assess the accident-causing negligence of
the plaintiff, the manufacturer has been denied the right to prove that all of
the plaintiff's injuries, enhanced and non-enhanced, were caused by the
plaintiff's own conduct. In other words, a special verdict that determines
only injury-enhancing fault presupposes the existence of a second impact.
78. Farrell v. John Deere Co., 151 Wis. 2d 45, 443 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1989). Farrell
involved a products liability and negligence action for damages caused to Gordon Farrell when he
was seriously injured in a farm accident involving a John Deere corn picker. Id. at 56, 443
N.W.2d at 53.
79. Id. at 66-67, 443 N.W.2d at 57.
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Similarly, evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence must be admit-
ted in order for the manufacturer to prove the affirmative defense that the
plaintiff's own conduct was a substantial factor in causing all of his injuries.
Although perhaps confusing to the jury, inquiry into the plaintiff's pre-
accident conduct is also necessary to permit the manufacturer to separate
the plaintiff's enhanced injuries from non-enhanced injuries. The manufac-
turer is not responsible for the injuries that would have occurred in the
accident absent a defective product. Nonetheless, because of the Sumnicht
and Maskrey decisions, a defendant manufacturer is obligated to prove
those injuries. It would be entirely inconsistent for the manufacturer to be
required to prove the extent and severity of the non-enhanced injuries in
order to satisfy its burden of proof without being able to offer evidence to
the jury of their cause. This is particularly evident in a death case, which is
qualitatively different from other cases since there does not appear to be a
way to measure the extent of enhancement. In such cases, the manufac-
turer must be entitled to introduce any evidence which proves that death
would have occurred in the collision because of the plaintiff's conduct even
absent a defective product. To that end, accident reconstruction and
human factors experts often rely on the pre-collision condition of the plain-
tiff to determine his most likely pre-accident physical reaction or movement
to the impending collision and the cause of his particular bodily injuries as
sustained between the first and second impacts.s°
B. Negligence of Other Actors
The admissibility of evidence relating to the negligence of other drivers
involved in the collision also creates a complex issue for the trial court in a
second collision case. A defendant-driver theoretically should not be re-
sponsible for enhanced injuries since his negligence can only cause the ini-
tial impact. A defendant-driver cannot proximately cause an enhanced
injury unless the plaintiff is a passenger in his vehicle."1 This presents an
attractive opportunity for plaintiff's counsel to move that the trial court
exclude all evidence of accident-causing negligence of the defendant-driver
so as to present the jury with evidence of only the manufacturer's defective
80. Occupant kinematics and biomechanics in the nature of reconstruction are two separate
fields of expertise offered to prove the apportionment of injury. Some courts have held that expert
testimony is necessary to apportion injuries. Trans-Cold Express, Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit,
Inc., 440 F.2d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1971); Rhynard v. Filori, 315 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir. 1963).
81. The defendant-driver's negligence in enhancing the plaintiff's injuries includes failing to




product. This strategy is often the only avenue for recovery where the de-
fendant-driver is 100% at fault for the collision, yet insolvent or uninsured.
Despite the logical appeal of excluding the defendant-driver's negligence
in order to simplify the issues for the jury, the manufacturer has the right to
introduce evidence of the negligence of all potential tortfeasors whether or
not they can be liable as a matter of law.82 In fact, the Maskrey special
verdict required the jury to consider the responsibility of the defendant-
driver in causing the plaintiff's injuries."
Exclusion of evidence respecting the defendant-driver's negligence also
contravenes the law of apportionment between successive tortfeasors.
Under Wisconsin law of apportionment of damages between successive
tortfeasors, the original tortfeasor can be held liable for all of the damages,
including the enhanced damages caused by the second tortfeasor. 4 If the
original tortfeasor can be held liable for all damages, including enhanced
injuries, and the subsequent tortfeasor can be liable only for enhanced inju-
ries, then it necessarily follows that the court cannot preclude the subse-
quent tortfeasor from offering evidence that all of plaintiff's injuries were
caused by the negligence of the original tortfeasor. Furthermore, the de-
fendant-driver's negligence should also be admissible to enable the manu-
facturer to prove that no enhancement occurred. Since it is the
manufacturer's burden of proof to apportion injuries, an absolute defense
can be established by demonstrating that the defendant-driver was 100% at
fault for causing all of the plaintiff's injuries. This could occur in a wrong-
ful death action where the evidence shows that death resulted from the high
speed of the vehicles at impact, instead of a defect in the product design.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article focuses on the admissibility of accident-causing negligence
in a second collision case. With the growing number of complex products
liability actions, perhaps the concept of the enhanced injury will become
more clearly defined and the confusion relating to the admissibility of acci-
dent-causing negligence eliminated.
82. When apportioning negligence, a jury must consider the negligence of all parties to the
transaction giving rise to the cause of action, whether or not they are immune from liability to the
plaintiff either by settlement or operation of law. Connar v. West Shore Equip. Inc., 68 Wis. 2d
42, 44-46, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662-63 (1975).
83. See supra notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text.
84. See generally Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976); Krenz v. Medi-
cal Protective Co., 57 Wis. 2d 387, 204 N.W.2d 663 (1973); Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp.,
51 Wis. 2d 281, 187 N.W.2d 349 (1971).
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At this juncture, Wisconsin trial courts must look to the standards of
proof as set forth in Sumnicht and Maskrey as guidance in addressing the
relevancy of evidence of contributory negligence of the plaintiff in causing
enhanced injuries. Courts need only refer to the Wisconsin law of compara-
tive negligence and successive tortfeasor liability to determine the admissi-
bility of evidence respecting the negligence of defendant-drivers.
Courts and trial counsel should be encouraged to further develop sec-
ond collision theory as a viable and sometimes sole means of recovery for
the injured plaintiff. The conceptual underpinnings of the doctrine, how-
ever, must always remain intact in order to prevent it from evolving into an
incomprehensible and overly expansive theory of recovery applicable to
cases that do not involve genuine enhanced injuries. Confusion and incon-
sistency can be minimized through the application of traditional tort princi-
ples to the original concept of the enhanced injury.

